COURTING THE VIRTUAL III. Impacts of Dispersion on
the Spaces/Functions of the Courthouse
This section assesses how the spaces and functions of the courthouse
might operate if barriers to virtual implementation were removed. A. The Library
Arguably, there are no technological barriers to creating a virtual
court library, defined as a resource
for legal and other case-related research that has no fixed or unique
physical location.[1]
The on-line availability of the full texts of cases, statutes, regulations,
registers, legislative histories, treatises, and the other documents of
the traditional court library is already or could become an accomplished
fact. Any paper-based library with unique or rare historical collections could create
electronically transmittable images of those holdings, though perhaps
not text-searchable documents.
All of the courts’ public documents can be uploaded to the Internet
by courts themselves or by anyone else with the resources to do so.
Granting the possibility of placing all relevant information on-line,
however, raises more questions than it resolves. Two questions in particular
should be addressed here: First,
how accessible would the virtual court library be?
And second, how good would it be?
The question of accessibility should be made more specific by asking,
“accessible to whom?” Regarding the court library’s primary customers,
the court’s judges and law clerks, accessibility could no doubt be as
complete as required. After
all, federal judges already enjoy virtually unlimited access to all electronic
legal resources through national contracts with private value-added providers
(“fee sites” like Lexis and Westlaw), as well as access to “free sites”
on the Web. The question
for judges is not so much what they
can have electronically, as what they might eventually have to relinquish
in hard copy.
The court library’s secondary customers are the members of the
court’s bar with cases before the court.[2]
The analysis of their access to the virtual court library could
proceed as follows: If a
lawyer is already on-line when he or she needs material available in the
virtual court library, the important distinction is the one between accessibility
to free sites and fee sites. With
proper electronic identification, these lawyers could gain access to the
court-supported virtual library equal to the judges’ access; in that event
they would be completely well-served.
Wherever their access might be restricted, for example if they
were denied access to a fee site on the court’s account, they
could acquire their own account and pass the costs along to their
clients. This is, of course,
what they do right now.[3]
Thus for well-financed lawyers already on-line, the virtual federal
court library appears to present little threat of reduced access to necessary
information.
What about the lawyers who cannot afford to go on-line, underfinanced
pro se litigants, and the public? In the current system, many federal
court libraries are selective
depository libraries, which means that
they routinely receive sets of government publications from the
Government Printing Office that they are required to make available to
the public.[4]
The public can also access hard-copy West Reporters in the
circuit libraries, but they cannot access the fee sites in any
of them. If the hard-copy libraries were to disappear in favor of the
virtual federal court library, either these on-line services (or their
equivalents) would have to be provided at public expense, or else the
public, including some attorneys and pro se litigants, would be denied
access to an important legal resource in the virtual federal court library.
[5]
The potential denial of public access to fee sites in the virtual
library introduces the second question of how good
the virtual court library would be.
Even assuming for the moment that all necessary information were
electronically available, how
would the ordinary user find it? The information organization and search
engines of the fee sites remain superior to those available for free.[6]
One way to characterize this is to think of the fee sites as providing
the services of a skilled legal librarian as well as a complete set of
case and analytic materials. The librarians available on-line for free
are not, in general, as skilled or knowledgeable as those who charge for
their services. Given the commercial incentives for fee site owners to
stay ahead of freeware providers, is there any reason to believe that
a virtual “free public law librarian” will emerge on-line that is equal
to the fee sites in its service?
Would it make sense for the federal courts to fund access to fee
sites for underfinanced attorneys and pro se litigants with cases before
the court, thus leveling the playing field relative to the current accessibility
of value-added legal research tools in hard-copy libraries?
Does the contemplation of these questions suggest that hard-copy
law libraries providing these tools are going to be around for a long
time?
We have so far assumed a fact that is far from true, namely that
even fundamental federal court case materials are uniformly and reliably
available on-line as a public good.
The reality is quite different.
For example one recent report found that only two district courts
place their opinions on the Web, and it made no mention of any bankruptcy
court decisions on-line from the courts.
The availability of Supreme
Court and appellate court decisions is considerably greater, but materials
from these courts are not co-located in a single searchable database
at a free site.[7]
This line of thinking leads to imagining a project that attempts
to gather the electronic equivalents of all court slip opinions uniformly,
accurately, and consistently
from all the federal courts and put them up on the Web with a powerful
search engine available for downloading.
And this, in turn, produces a strong sense of deja
vu, because the project would, even if successful, recreate what is
already available at fee sites.
The perception that this service would be “free” would itself be
illusory. The truth would be, rather, that the people who are paying the
costs are not necessarily the same
people who are using the service.
Whether this is a good idea or not is not a technological question.
One can wonder, nevertheless,
why all federal courts do not routinely send their slip opinions
to the depository library program at the Government Printing Office.
The GPO could place the opinions on their Web site, which already
provides a modest search capability.[8]
It seems, then, that we
are currently far from a publicly supported virtual federal court library
and that, given current court library policies, even the completely stocked
virtual federal court library would have problems of accessibility and
digestibility. Some
of these problems, like their causes, are not technological, but arise
at the nexus of public policy, spending priorities, and commerce.
These conclusions should not obscure the benefits of practical
research into improving the availability of research tools that can operate
against materials downloaded from diverse sites supplying legal raw material.
From the federal courthouse perspective, such tools could be useful
in the work of judges and law clerks as well as that of lawyers and litigants
working “in the library.” We will return to the topic when we reach the judge’s virtual
chambers.
There is another related topic of research that should be conceptualized
in more detail and then divided into individual implementation projects.
The topic is framed by the following question: what will we mean
by “a publication” or “a document” in a virtual library?[9]
So far in this discussion we have conceived of the documents in
a library as more-or-less unitary, static entities which, once produced
and stored, are retrieved and used from time to time and replaced in their
appropriate location. Of
course, it is recognized that some important publications are revised
either on a schedule or aperiodically, like the U.S.C., C.F.R., etc.
Evolving case law is captured in successive editions of treatises,
specialized case reporters (appropriately called loose-leaf services),
and general search tools like Shepards.
Law librarians and legal publishers are experts at keeping these
materials current; successful legal research depends on this skill.
In the virtual law library, there is an opportunity radically to
re-define the nature of a document.
We have seen the beginning of this trend with the submission of
appellate briefs on CD-ROM disks.[10]
Though apparently radical at the instant, self-contained CD-ROM
submissions are in fact another form of hard copy.
The larger change arises when, beginning with a CD-ROM, the brief
introduces hyper-links that point outside the CD-ROM to sites on the Web
or other networks. A host of interesting questions arise when this possibility
is contemplated. We will consider just one example: should such links
to outside sources be permitted at all?
On the one hand, it would seem to be more efficient to allow links
to access fee sites directly[11]
rather than, as now, to require litigants to purchase licenses to copy
published opinions onto the CD-ROM.[12]
On the other hand, there is no way to assure the continued availability
of information from any hyper-link or other electronic address like a
phone number, or that the information at that location will remain exactly
as it was when the brief was submitted.
Further, the use of the CD-ROM as the medium of submissions may
eventually seem to be as quaint as submitting hand-written documents would
be today.
Finally, note that the shift in the medium of brief submission
from paper to electronic form (from atoms to bits, as Negroponte puts
it[13]
) has the consequence of blurring the traditional distinctions between
the library, the Clerk’s office, and judicial chambers. The “location”
of the court’s documents (the briefs, traditionally under the official
control of the Clerk, though they are intended for immediate distribution
to one or more judges) the “location” of supporting legal materials (cases,
statutes, regulations, etc., traditionally under the control of the library
though they are intended for the use of the judges), and the “location”
of documents and support materials in chambers,
take on new meanings. In
a sense, the materials are wherever they appear on a screen.
In another sense, they are wherever they reside on disk or tape
or other repository medium. Physical control of this medium and the related equipment will of
course be crucially important
for the security and integrity of the court’s work.
But it will be different from the functional
or content control that
Clerks and librarians will need to exercise in order to insure the substantive
integrity of this information.
B. The Clerk’s Office
Case event docketing and related document management are the
meat and potatoes on the federal court Clerk’s office plate.
Federal court automation began with an initiative to create an
electronic docketing system. Operational
versions of the system have been in place for more than 20 years.
The current nationally-supported system, operating in a UNIX environment,
was designed from scratch within the court system and, by now, is based
on very well-understood system logic.
The system’s performance in many courts, particularly for writing
reports, has been less than optimal, at least in part because the size
and complexity of the programs and databases have tended to swamp the
capacity of the available hardware.
The winds of change are blowing, stimulated by the insight that
docketing and document management can be combined in an electronic Clerk’s
Office environment. The direction
in which the courts and Administrative Office are moving stimulates the
development of a virtual federal court Clerk’s office.
In a nutshell,[14] the concept is to
encourage attorneys to submit all case-related documents to the
court electronically. Attached to the submitted document is an electronic cover page
containing all the necessary
identifiers and administrative information required for the Clerk’s Office
to accept the document and docket it.
Some cover page information is extracted and entered onto the court’s
electronic (official) docket for the case.
Any paper documents not available to the filing party electronically
would be scanned by the party and submitted electronically or scanned
by the court at the time of intake.
Once a filing has been logged onto the system and “filed,” electronic
notification can be sent to everyone in the court who needs to know (for
example Probation/Pretrial, U.S. Trustee, the courtroom deputy and chambers
staff of the judge or judges assigned to the case, the jury administrator,
etc.). Notice and service
can be also be accomplished electronically.
Electronic documents and other materials to be used at trial, or
pointers to them if they are irreducibly physical, can be assembled and
approved beforehand.
All judicial actions requiring docketing, and any related judicial
documents, would also be handled electronically, reversing the information
flow from chambers “through the Clerk’s office” and “out” to parties and
others with need to know. Such
a system is a powerful extensionof the public access system now in place,
called PACER. In the event
of an appeal, the record can be sent electronically to the court of appeals.
The goal of this model of case-information is to reduce traffic
in paper. Paper files can be cumbersome to organize and retrieve quickly,
are usually only available to one person at a time, and require constant
maintenance and significant storage space, may be lost, disassembled,
or misfiled, and are difficult to keep up-to-date.
Paper pleadings must be transmitted by mail or by hand delivery
in multiple copies for manual distribution.[15]
Thus, as now conceived, the electronic case files project aims
to enhance the values of expedition, timeliness, and accountability for
public resources. There are
no principled reasons to criticize the project on these or other value-based
grounds.
Implementation of this system, combined with existing programs
that reduce paper management (e.g. outsourcing the production and distribution
of bankruptcy notices), stands a good chance of achieving the aspirations
of its developers. Moreover,
the system sets the foundation for another very valuable service by the
court to its customers: creating a complete case file on-line with links
from docket entries at the highest level screen into all the documents
cited by the docket. This
linkage could be taken one step further if the citations found in the
lawyers’ pleadings and the judges’ opinions were in the form of links
to the source documents. The
issues raised by this possibility were described above in the library
discussion, and are noted by the authors of the Administrative Office
report.[16]
As evidenced, for example, by the success of the remote bankruptcy
noticing project, federal courts have taken substantial steps to eliminate
the constraints of geography in the management of official documents.
There is no technical reason why the system proposed and being tested
by the Administrative Office for electronic case files could not take
further advantage of broad bandwidth to distribute the location(s) of
the storage sites of dockets and related documents, if that turned out
to be cost-effective. Once the paper deluge has been brought under control,
exactly where the court’s files reside becomes a question similar to the question
of where the case law is located.
If managing the court’s files are the meat and potatoes of the
Clerk’s office, then perhaps, in the virtual courthouse, it should become
a (cost-effective) moveable feast. C. The Courtroom.
Section II.D.4 emphasized
the idea that the courtroom represents a focal point for the tension between
concentration and dispersion as consequences of innovations with technology. Unlike the library and Clerk’s office, where the dispersions
of function over space have been relatively uncontroversial, proposals
for dispersion of courtroom functions arouse deep concern that such changes
seriously threaten core values
of justice in the judicial system.
Can we state the issues clearly?
We can begin with the observation that concentrating technology
in the courtroom, if done tastefully, is largely uncontroversial. There
is now an active program to augment traditional courtrooms with electronic
recording and display equipment.
Document and physical evidence presenters, videotape and laser
disk players, projectors for videotape and computer displays, and computer-aided
stenography with real-time display, all bring a new visual intensity to
the proceedings. When these installations are done carefully the results are
functionally effective and esthetically satisfying.[17] A major rationale for court investments in concentrated courtroom technology is the ability to present information (evidence, testimony, visual aids to argument) developed at an earlier time. Often, the information has been previously recorded with the intent of displaying it during trial (documents, depositions, views, “days-in-the-life,” confessions, animations and simulations, etc.). Its form and content are controlled by evidentiary rules intended to maximize the benefits and minimize the risks of its use. Increased use of technology to facilitate the use of these asynchronous displays does not fundamentally alter the structure of the proceeding--in effect, their use becomes business as usual conducted more efficiently and effectively. [18]
As summarized in the graphic,
controversy increases when technology is used to allow participants in
the proceeding to “appear in court”[19]
via telephone or video technology (synchronous audio or audiovisual display).
Not surprisingly, there is less judicial objection to remote feeds for
appellate argument than for trial and pre-trial proceedings.
At least three federal
circuits (Second, Third, and Tenth) have used or soon will use videoconferencing
to connect lawyers at remote sites to an appellate panel seated in a traditional
courtroom. Nor has the use of videoconferencing been particularly controversial
when used for the convenience of bar and bench in the bankruptcy court,
as in the Western District of Texas and Middle District of Florida.
Within district court proceedings, the issues are
especially pointed on the criminal side of the docket, largely
because of concern with violating the confrontation clause of the Sixth
Amendment, but there are also appellate rulings prohibiting the use of
testimony by telephone in a civil case.
The footnote points to some of the important cases.[20]
There is some language in the cases that points to an implicit,
almost inchoate psychological theory behind the limitation on audiovisual
input from remote sites during a trial:
“[I]n some undefined but real way recollection, veracity, and communication
are influenced by face-to-face challenge.”[21]
In the context of synchronous displays in a traditional courtroom,
this dictum poses the critical
questions: is it possible, and is it feasible, to develop an audiovisual
courtroom experience for participants
at several physical locations, such that “recollection, veracity, and
communication” would not be weaker, and might be stronger, than they are
in face-to-face trials generally?
As if these conjectures were not controversial enough, synchronous
participation by remote parties displayed in a traditional courtroom is
not the end of the logical or technological road.
As one thinks about increasing the
proportion of remote participants to a proceeding, one queries
the inviolable necessity of physically co-locating the judge and traditional
courtroom furnishings inside traditional courthouses.
As a thought experiment, imagine a proceeding in which every participant
in the proceeding were to appear before the judge and each other from
remote locations, and the public could, so to speak, tune in.
Would these appearances still need to be piped to a traditional
courtroom with the judge in corporeal attendance there, robed in black?
If so, why? If not, why not?
What would such appearances mean?
To what ends would they contribute?
(At this point, as a form of shorthand, I introduce a single term
to capture the entirety of the experience that attends being-in-the-courtroom,
with all its stimulation of recollection, veracity, and communication––all
the legally important dimensions of the real thing.
The term is verisimilitude.[22])
This thought experiment undercuts our reliance on the synchronous
co-location of trial participants in traditional spaces.
It requires us to scrutinize
the logical and empirical demands of the trial as a means of arriving
at the legal resolution of a dispute and a satisfactory account of the
facts behind the dispute. The
value scheme that we have accepted requires our court proceedings to guarantee
equality, fairness, and integrity.
It requires further that we allow the
public to have full confidence in the courts.
But we should not allow ourselves to escape the challenge of innovation
by claiming irrefutable superiority for traditional practices and procedures
just because they are traditional.
How do we set benchmarks of value for current practices, so that
innovations can be tested against them?
How much verisimilitude is enough?
Is it possible to enhance verisimilitude beyond the average traditional
trial?
There is yet another twist in the road.
Having relaxed the requirement of co-location, the final step (probably
the last straw for some) is to relax the requirement of synchronicity,
so that now the proceedings have been “re-located” in both time and space.
In other words, so long as certain time frames are observed for
every stage of a litigation (such as those established by the Speedy Trial
Act, or local Civil Justice Reform Act rules, or quantified Trial Court
Performance Standards, or whatever) there is no need to
insist that parties appear at the same time to argue before the
judge. Disputants can submit
their materials to the court, following all appropriate rules of notice
and distribution, and the
court can review them, ask questions, make rulings, remotely and asynchronously,
in just the same way. Putting
aside the obvious difficulties of conducting a jury trial in this fashion
(without relaxing further constraints about how juries work), it seems
reasonable to imagine this working for civil pre-trial proceedings, especially
those involving discovery motions.
There may also be a number of bankruptcy proceedings and hearings
that could be conducted in this fashion.
Finally, it should be feasible to extend these methods into court-annexed
or other non-litigative dispute resolving schemes, including mediation,
arbitration, early neutral evaluation, perhaps even some variant on summary
jury trial. The key to successful
experimentation and innovation will be to choose proceedings that are
now important enough, and costly enough, to warrant the investment in
finding an efficient and effective alternative facilitated through technology.[23]
D. Jury deliberation room and judicial chambers
1. The deliberation room. The functionality of the jury’s space
for deliberation could evolve along the same lines as the courtroom:
at the beginning, playback technology will be deployed within the
traditional space to improve the group’s retrieval and analysis of information;
and later on, additional communications technology will be used to eliminate
the requirement that the jury be physically together at the same time
and place. Ultimately,
the entire jury process including screening and voir dire as well as deliberating
to a decision, could be conducted on-line.
A most modest beginning of the first trend can be seen in a loosening
of prohibitions on juror note-taking. Absent knowledge of judicial opinions
to the contrary, allowing jurors to take notes during trial and use them
during deliberation seems to be a reasonable way to support accurate fact-finding––an
application of very low technology.
It appears that the traditional judicial resistance to note-taking
is weakening, and research provides reassurance that permitting the practice
is unlikely to threaten the integrity of the jury process and may even
do some good.[24]
Though the rate of change may be slow, we can expect a trend toward
permitting the jury to review evidence and testimony that was presented
electronically during trial. The
trend will be driven by the increasing use of electronically-driven displays
in traditional courtrooms. The
rationales for prohibiting review of these materials will weaken as the
ease with which they can be reviewed increases.
Practically equal to the symbolic significance of the public trials
is the symbolic significance of the jury deliberating face-to-face behind
a wall of complete confidentiality.
Anyone who doubts the ferocity with which the sanctity of the jury
room’s privacy is defended by elected officials need only read the transcript
of the Congressional hearings about the court-approved jury eavesdropping
conducted by University of Chicago researchers in Wichita, Kansas during
the 1950s.[25]
Yet even this wall has been breached, as in Arizona and Wisconsin
where the deliberations of state court jurors have been videotaped (with
their knowledge) and subsequently broadcast on national television.[26]
The co-location of jurors during deliberations, including their
sequestration in extreme cases, must be justified by a need to protect
them from influence and intimidation (and perhaps to keep them focused
on the task and encourage a speedy decision) rather than by a belief that
the accuracy and completeness of their deliberative process are improved
by keeping them confined for hours at a time in a small room.
Can we imagine a system in which the jury is empaneled in a virtual
courtroom and deliberates in a virtual space protected completely against
intrusion? One could probably
design and implement such a system, given the context of a virtual trial
to begin with. It is
more difficult to imagine a sufficient rationale and showing of cost-effectiveness,
particularly in the context of a typical cause of action, fact pattern,
and use of a lay jury. As
with the trial itself, the path of evolution may begin with activities
that are specialized (a trial by experts before a blue-ribbon jury or
panel of judges) or with proceedings that are located in the shadow of
the courthouse, rather than in the traditional spaces with rich symbolic
significance.[27]
2.
The chambers.
There are two questions to ask about the impact of technology
on federal judicial chambers: 1) How will complete inter-connectivity affect the current
architectural and office practices?
2) How can the potential of new systems and software improve the
analytic and deliberative functions of the judge and chambers legal staff?
a.
The space. The federal judge’s private space in the courthouse
resembles a successful solo practitioner’s office. There is an ample library, comfortable space for two or more
law clerks, one or more secretaries, and, in some districts, the judge’s
courtroom deputy (who otherwise sits in space assigned to the Clerk).
There is a private bathroom and perhaps a shower and small kitchen.
There are powerful networked PC’s on the desks with direct access to electronic
dockets, dial-out access to one or more fee sites, and perhaps connections
to the net and a Web browser. The judge has free parking, access to an elevator and, in most
courthouses, is surrounded by a reasonable degree of personal security.
There is an adjacent courtroom that the judge
seldom if ever must share with other judges. If the judge’s duties require holding court in another division
in the district or circuit, one or more clerks will also make the trips.
The judge and staff will have comfortable and secure chambers space
in the remote location.
Clearly, this is not a working environment that most people would
choose to relinquish in favor of a virtual office on a laptop computer. Yet if the judge wishes to access work files while at home,
or to load files on a laptop for work on an airplane or other location,
that option is also available. In
short, federal judges can already take advantage of the benefits of an
electronic office without losing the substantial benefits of courthouse
architecture and space allocations.
b.
Decision support. Competition
among providers of fee sites and other legal research systems (e.g. CD-ROM)
seems to assure that the fruits of new search, retrieval, and analytic
capacities will be available to the marketplace whenever the demand will
support the costs of development.
In general, advances that support the bar will also be useful to
the bench. In addition to
commercial developments, there are two other sources of enhanced decision
support for federal chambers.
In the specialized area of criminal sentencing, for example, there
is a program developed by the United States Sentencing Commission, called
ASSYST, that aids probation officers, or judges if they choose to use
it, in working through offender and offense characteristics to arrive
at sentencing ranges. And there is a small but active group of academics who develop
advanced retrieval and analytic systems.
These systems are advanced in that they incorporate software developments
that are new enough to be interesting to computer scientists; they are
not advanced in the sense of improving on the quality of legal research
and analysis already occurring in federal judicial chambers.[28]
It is obvious, but nevertheless important to remember, that federal
judges already have the services of one or more “research and analysis
engines” far superior to anything now on the software market or likely
to be, namely, their law clerks. These budding experts will be able to benefit from any marginal
enhancements to retrieval methods, particularly for highly specialized
legal domains (e.g. patents, other scientific issues).
Perhaps a useful domain for development would be sophisticated
checklists for factors that need to be considered in respect to case types
or issues that recur frequently.[29]
Finally, it seems clear that judges and their staffs will benefit
from innovations emerging out of work in the Clerk’s Office and library,
in which the entire record of a case can be put into one document containing
links to all the other materials required for a judicial decision.
Several models for how this might be accomplished have been published
in the AI literature. To
one degree or another, they require that participants in a law suit alter
their current practices, in order to take advantage of the processing
and communications power of the model.
One example is discussed in the following paragraphs.
c. The Next Step:
Intelligence in Case Space. In 1995, Philip Greenspun and Marc Lauritsen briefly described
a Common Lisp computer program, the Knowledge Theorist for Attorneys (KTA),
that begins with current conceptions of electronic case filing and moves
to the next level. They define
an abstract “case space” with the following characteristics: “...documents received
and produced by courts will eventually be marked up with codes that identify
their contents in terms of abstract categories relevant to the judicial
process. For instance, paragraphs
in complaints will be tagged according to their character as factual allegations,
jurisdictional statements, legal claims or defenses, or requests for other
judicial actions. For each
case in a particular court, a data structure will exist that contains
the names and other characteristics of all parties, claims, witnesses,
and decision makers, summaries of all formal legal events, and pointers
to all documents filed or generated.
Conventional querying tools will allow one to ascertain, for example,
the average award in product liability actions against asbestos manufacturers
in which the plaintiff was 45 years or older and resident in a
southern state. ...[W]e call
this distributed database “case space.”[30]
Greenspun and Lauritsen designed KTA in part to eliminate paperflow
while retaining all the procedures now accomplished through paper filings
and retrievals. Their goal
for research was to make the grain of analysis much finer than it is currently
in court databases by marking natural units of text (paragraphs?) with
tags to identify their status in the advocate’s argument.
Users in different categories (judges, court clerks, advocates,
the public, etc.) would have Web access to appropriate slices of the database.
For the judge, the flow of the case would be laid out graphically,
and key elements, as identified by the software engine, would be highlighted.
Greenspun and Lauritsen’s article provides an example of such a
display based loosely on an actual consumer complaint case.[31] Greenspun and Lauritsen’s model is in one sense conservative because it strives to sustain the feel of information flow in a traditional paper-based litigation environment and because it avoids full-text or natural language searching in favor of codes and indexes. It is very progressive, nevertheless, because it comprehends the entirety of how information flows in cases, and it places the flow on-line. As a tool for judges, advocates, and scholars, and other constituencies interested in ongoing litigation, the implementation of a system like KTA in a court could be very useful. [1] For comments by law library experts on what a law library is, see The Future of the Law Firm Library: The AALL Electronic Roundtable. 89 Law. Lib. J. 99, 112 (1997). [2] This discussion ignores the possibility that the inaccessibility of some materials in the virtual library could be remedied by their hard-copy availability in some other library, because the problem would just arise again when that library becomes exclusively electronic. [3] The AALL Electronic Roundtable cited in the previous note includes a discussion on whether the costs of law firm library services should be billed as a separate charge with its own hourly rate, or built into the firm’s overhead structure and hidden there. One of the ironic effects of good library assistance, noted in the discussion, is to reduce the number of billable hours by attorneys. See The Future of the Law Firm Library at 116 et seq. [4] 44 U.S.C. §1911 provides that depository libraries shall make Government publications available for the free use of the general public. [5] Lexis-Nexis and Westlaw contracts with courts limit access to court employees. I thank Terri Santella, Assistant Librarian at the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, Patricia McDermott, Librarian at the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, and Robin Haun-Mohamed of the Government Printing Office, for helpful conversations on these points. [6] A Lexis-Nexis advertisement on-line in 1996 noted that, at that time, it was adding 14 million documents per week to its database, for a total of more than 1 billion, while the Web was growing at about 300 thousand documents per week, for an estimated total of 39 million documents. More telling than the totals, however, is the density of useful information in the Lexis-Nexis and Westlaw databases and the availability of various utility programs like Shepards, Insta-Cite, QuickCite, and so on. Although most of us have our favorite free legal search sites and ways of finding most of what we may need, my own experience, at least, suggests that the fee sites save a lot of time and provide a greater sense of confidence that one has found what there is to find on a point of law. See also Margot Williams, Services Using Web Engines Challenge Commercial Databases. Washington Post Business Supplement, February 23, 1998, at 23. [7] James H. Johnston, Why Aren’t More Decisions Online? Legal Times of Washington, January 26, 1998 at S42. The district courts with opinions available on-line are the Central District of California and the District of Idaho. Many other districts have published Web sites containing administrative information useful to people with business at the courthouse. [8] See www.access.gpo.gov. It would be interesting to calculate the size of the federal court annual corpus of case text in relation to the size of the current GPO website databases. [9] The dictionary allows “document” to mean any written paper as well as an official or legal paper. In the current distinction, that difference becomes more difficult to sustain. For example, if a judge quotes from a scientific article in an opinion by entering text from the article into the written opinion, the entered text becomes part of the official document. If the judge publishes the opinion on the court’s Web site, and places a hyperlink to the article at the location where he would otherwise have typed in the text, does the text from the article become part of the document in the same way? [10] See Yukiyo v. Watanabe, 111 F.3d 883 (Fed. Cir., 1997) (denying permission to use CD-ROM brief on appeal but leaving door open for rule changes to permit the use). [11] I am ignoring here the technical distinction between dial-up single-site locations and sites on the Web. [12] By analogy with current practice, courts do not require litigants to attach photocopies of cases to which they cite in their briefs. [13] Nicholas Negroponte, BEING DIGITAL (Knopf, 1995). [14] This account is an abbreviation of pages 10-14, ELECTRONIC CASE FILES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS (Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Discussion Draft, March 1997). For updates, see http://www.courts.net/efiling.htm , and Jeannette Plante, Filing Over the Internet: An Experiment in New Mexico. 9 Court Technology Bulletin 1 (Nov./Dec. 1997). [15] Id., at 2-3. [16] Id., at 40. [17] The Administrative Office has a videotape library documenting some of these courtrooms including for example but not limited to those in Washington, D.C., Minneapolis, Minnesota, and Shreveport, Louisiana. See also Linda Mack, New Order in the Court, Minneapolis Star Tribune, June 23, 1997, B1. [18] An excellent single source for the advocate is Gregory P. Joseph, MODERN VISUAL EVIDENCE (Law Journal Seminars-Press, 1984). Videotaped depositions have become newsworthy again because of their significance in very high-profile litigation. Jones v. Clinton, 117 S. Ct. 1636. 1643(note 14), 1649 (1997). But the technology has been used for a long time. Judge James McCrystal in the Court of Common Please, Erie County, Ohio, used videotaped depositions threaded together to form a so-called Pre-recorded Videotaped Trial (PRVTT) during the 1960’s; the method had a brief try-out in California during the early 1970’s. For the history of these early developments and a contemporary analysis of the issues that is still pertinent, see Gordon Bermant, Duncan Chappell, Geraldine T. Crockett, M.-Daniel Jacoubovitch, and Mary McGuire, Juror responses to pre-recorded videotape trial presentations in California and Ohio. 26 Hastings Law J. 975 (1975), and Gordon Bermant and M.-Daniel Jacoubovitch, Fish Out Of Water: A Brief Overview Of Social And Psychological Concerns About Videotape Trials, 26 Hastings Law J. 999 (1975). [19] I place the phrase inside quotes to avoid begging the question whether the display suffices as being in court under current rules. [20] I cannot within the framework of this paper do more than point to a few of these cases, some of which have addressed the legality of asynchronous displays (videotaped depositions of witnesses who could not be present at the trial) and others, more pertinent to the immediate discussion, ruled on the use of synchronous remote feeds into the trial courtroom. At the Supreme Court, Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990) permitted a narrow exception to the face-to-face requirement of the Confrontation Clause when a child witness was involved. The Eighth Circuit has held the use of the telephone for cross-examination, even in a very unusual set of circumstances, to be in violation of the Confrontation Clause, but affirmed the underlying felony conviction on the grounds of harmless error (U.S. v. Jacobs, 97 F.3d 275, 8th Cir. 1996). In Valenzuela-Gonzales v. U.S. Dist. Court for Arizona, 915 F 2d. 1276 (1990), the Ninth Circuit issued mandamus to the District Court vacating an order requiring Valenzuela’s arraignment to be conducted via a closed-circuit television hook-up between his place of detention and the courthouse--Valenzuela’s two co-defendant’s had already been arraigned using the procedure. Writing for a unanimous panel, Judge Beezer grounded the mandamus in Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 10 and 43(a), but not in the Constitution: “Under Rule 43, the defendant must be present at arraignment. Under Rule 10, the arraignment must take place in open court. We hold that these rules together require that the district court must arraign the accused face-to-face with the accused physically present in the courtroom.” Finally, in civil trials, the Eighth Circuit found that a witness participating “live” but by telephone does not count as an appearance in open court and is thus violation of F. R. Civ. Proc. 43(a). Murphy v. Tivoli, 953 F.2d 354, 359 (8th Cir. 1992). The federal rulemakers apparently responded with a 1996 amendment that permits the court, “for good cause shown in compelling circumstances and upon appropriate safeguards, [to] permit presentation of testimony in open court by contemporaneous transmission from a different location.” The committee notes to the 1996 amendment exhort the courts to allow contemporaneous transmission only very cautiously: “The very ceremony of trial and the presence of the fact finder may exert a powerful force for truthtelling. The opportunity to judge the demeanor of a witness face-to-face is accorded great value in our tradition.” [21] U.S. v. Benfield, 593 F.2d 815, 821 (8th Cir. 1979). See also the committee note quoted just above. [22] I introduced the term in 1974. Gordon Bermant, Mary V. McGuire, William McKinley, and Chris Salo, The Logic of Simulation in Jury Research. 1 Criminal Justice & Behavior 223 (1974). [23] There is a Virtual Magistrate Project that specializes in on-line arbitration of certain sorts of cyberspace disputes. See htpp://vmag.clip.org/ [24] Steven D. Penrod and Larry Heuer, Tweaking Commonsense: Assessing Aids to Jury Decision Making. 3 Psychology, Public Policy and Law 259, 271 (1997). [25] The Wichita Jury Recording Case. In Jay Katz, EXPERIMENTATION WITH HUMAN BEINGS 67, 80 et seq. (Russell Sage Foundation, 1972). [26] The Wisconsin trial jury deliberations were reported by PBS in 1986. The Arizona trials were reported by CBS in 1997. See Timothy Noah, Why is TV in a jury room? U.S. News and World Report, April 21, 1997 (available at www.usnews.com/usnews/issue/970421/21medi.htm.) [27] For the use of decision support technology with juries, see Karen H. Field, Mark A. Zaffarano, and Yihwa Irene Lious, Management Note: Bringing Technology to the Jury Deliberation Table. 18 Justice System J. 317 (1996). [28] The fruits of labor of the academic side can be found in the annual PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LAW, which now run to six volumes. Another very valuable single source of information is the course syllabus Professor Edwina Rissland compiled for her course on artificial intelligence and the law at the Harvard Law School, Fall Semester, 1995. The ACM website at http://www.acm.org/ is a window on the entire space from the engineering perspective. [29] One might find several candidates in the work of the bankruptcy courts, particularly if, as expected, new statutory thresholds for bankruptcy eligibility will be introduced during the next couple of Congressional sessions. [30] Philip Greenspun and Marc Lauritsen, Making Way for Intelligence in Case Space. PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND THE LAW 96 (Assoc. Comp. Machinery, 1995). [31] For more detail on the case, and Greenspun’s treatment of case material in a purely hypertext fashion, see http://photo.net/smyly. |