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COURTING THE VIRTUAL

IV.  Conclusion: Where does a case happen
?

            As I went through the exercise of making virtual each room of the courthouse and its traditional functions, I experienced a gnawing discomfort, a growing unease that something was missing: at the end, the exercise seemed not to have captured enough about how the possibilities of the Internet are going to transform litigation and adjudication as we know it. 

            I believe that the problem arose from assuming, implicitly, that courts are going to come on-line in an environment of substantive and procedural law that will remain fixed––as if the influence of cyberspace would not change the very fabric of social and economic relationships that courts exist to protect.   But there is too much evidence that these changes are already occurring to make the assumption even a convenient fiction. No one can be certain about what all of these changes will be, or forecast their time courses. Two big reasons for this are that interested parties are already contending for control of the directions of change, and other parties have not yet fully understood that they should become interested. 

            In this section I will sketch the outlines of a few topics that seem to show how courts can and perhaps must change as a result of the opportunities and imperatives cyberspace  will create in related domains. 

            A. Personal jurisdiction  

            The law of personal jurisdiction takes on a new dimension when commercial transactions move across state lines over the Internet.  Federal case law is beginning to respond to the new demands of dispute resolution in cyberspace.  David Post and Dawn C. Nunziato of the Cyberspace Law Institute have published a list, last updated in October, 1997, containing approximately 20 separate federal cases, including 3 appellate cases,  that stake out the boundaries  of “minimal contacts” in cyberspace.  The majority of cases in the list have found in favor of  personal jurisdiction in the forum court on the basis of the availability of the foreign Web site there.[1] 

            These cases were, of course, litigated in the traditional fashion: lawyers for the foreign party had to travel to the forum state for hearings and trial.  Given the nature of the dispute and the technical sophistication of the parties, were these trips necessary?  Could the litigation have been accomplished on-line, with the parties submitting pleadings and briefs to the court through an appropriately secured Web interface?  As Internet commerce proliferates, causing a great growth in otherwise ordinary commercial disputes, does a robust Internet-based litigation system become a virtual necessity? 

            B. Subject matter jurisdiction: CORE courts 

            Will entities that are linked together electronically to do business need the services of a dispute resolving system that operates in the same frames of reference as they do?  Reliance on electronic technology inevitably creates a great need for specialization;  disputes arising out of the commerce exploiting technologies appear to require increasing specialization by judges and perhaps juries as well.  In the federal courts, however, the concept of the generalist judge with jurisdiction in a defined geographic area is given a very high value loading, as evidenced, for example by the language of recommendations in the courts’ long range plan.  At the appellate level,   Recommendation 16 states that  “The federal appellate function should be performed primarily in: (a) a generalist court of appeals established in each regional judicial circuit; and (b) a Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit with nationwide jurisdiction in certain subject-matter areas.” At the district court level, Recommendation 24 states that “Except in certain limited contexts (i.e. bankruptcy proceedings, international trade matters, and claims against the federal government) the primary trial forum for disputes committed to federal jurisdiction should be a generalist district court whose judges are affiliated with, and required to reside in, the court’s general geographic region, and whose facilities are reasonably accessible to litigants, jurors, witnesses, and other participants in the judicial process.[2]  

            From the perspective of cyberspace, the generalist judge with a jurisdiction limited by physical geography begins to appear anachronistic.  Moreover, in cyberspace the exceptions noted in the recommendations for specialization may devour the rule, particularly as “international trade matters” become much more frequent visitors to federal dockets. 

            Roberta Katz has argued in favor of developing as many specialized courts as necessary to do proper justice to burgeoning areas of legal and technical specialization.[3]  She  calls her subject-matter forums “CORE Courts,” an acronym for “COmmonality/REsolution.” [4]   In her view, “The gap between real-world specialization and judicial generalism is...a significant contributor to the growing sense of injustice and unfairness in our courts.”  She provides many examples of subject-matter areas for a single CORE court, and describes how ADR would be built into each CORE Court’s set of procedures.   

             For current purposes, I would emphasize just one point:  if national courts of special subject-matter jurisdiction develop on CORE Court lines or in some other model,  the specifications of a judge’s geographic jurisdiction will change as profoundly as the definition of subject-matter jurisdiction.  The option of conducting court business in the virtual courthouse could  become an economic necessity rather than a mere convenience.  

            One must not move too quickly to discount the importance of judges who are known in their communities  as the personification of federal law there. The judge is an emblem of the Federal Presence just as the courthouse is.   Recall that the fifth value embodied in the Trial Court Performance Standards is public acceptance.  Will a public respect a federal bench whose members have indeterminate physical and social relationships with the parties who “come before” them? 

C.  Mutually embedded sovereigns: comity and delegation 

            One of the fullest expositions of how the maturing of cyberspace requires  radical re-assessment of the reach of law as we know it is the article “Law and Borders––The Rise of Law in Cyberspace,” by David Johnson and David Post.[5]    Johnson and Post believe that in cyberspace, “separated from doctrine tied to territorial jurisdictions, new rules will emerge, in a variety of on-line spaces, to govern a wide range of new phenomena that have no clear parallel in the nonvirtual world.  These new rules will play the role of law by defining legal personhood and property, resolving disputes, and crystallizing a collective conversation about core values.”[6]   In a truly original turn, the authors foresee a self-regulating cyberspace that relates to traditional local authorities according to two well-known legal principles:  “In applying both the doctrine of ‘comity’ and the idea of ‘delegation’ [as is done with other self-regulating groups], a local sovereign is called upon to defer to the self-regulatory judgments of a population partly, but not wholly, composed of its own subjects”[7]    

            Among the many implications of this view of the future is one especially pertinent to the current discussion.  Some communications between the “local sovereign” and their counterparts in cyberspace, however constituted,  must occur in the native tongue and on the home ground of cyberspace––comity demands no less.  But, as we have seen, the courts are learning the new language and acquiring cyberspace real estate for their own reasons.  Given the trajectory of the federal courts into the use of cyberspace on grounds of efficiency and effectiveness (like immigrants seeking a better life in the New World), it seems that the courts become citizens of the new self-regulating territory as well as potential regulatory entities outside of it.  This implies interdependency, which, of course, we see already at work in the rules for establishing domain names for the courts and their administrative bodies.  The identities of the governor and the governed become ambiguous here.[8] 

            These considerations support a conclusion that the vectors pointing courts in the direction of virtual courthouses grow from two different origins.   One is embedded in the core values associated with efficient and effective practice of court work as we know it in its traditional form.  This is the vector that began as “automation” of manual labor and now is dissolving the walls that have separated the library, Clerk’s office, courtroom, and chambers from each other.    The other origin is located in the need of courts, as cyberspace citizens and agents of “foreign sovereigns” at the same time,  to assimilate to the culture of their new location––because if they don’t, like immigrants everywhere, they will find it difficult to make a living.



[1]   The list and full text of the cases are at http://www.cli.org/DPost/jcases.html

[2] LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS  at 43,50.

[3]   Roberta Katz, JUSTICE MATTERS: RESCUING THE LEGAL SYSTEM FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (Discovery Institute, 1997).

[4]   Id. , at 125.

[5]   48 Stanford L.R. 1367 (1996).  Also available in hypertext format at http://www.cli.org.

[6]  Id.

[7]   Id.

[8]   I am uneasy pushing the analogy of comity too far, given the pre-emptive authority exercised by federal courts over events in cyberspace.  See, for example, Gail Diane Cox, First Conviction for Hate E-Mail. National Law Journal, February 23, 1998, at A8.  (Federal jury convicts extreme Internet “flamer” under a statute prohibiting interference with federally protected activities; and Wendy R. Leibowitz, Is ‘Net Registration Fee Illegal? National Law Journal, March 2, 1998, at A7. (Federal judge issues preliminary injunction against collecting fee above cost of registering an Internet domain-name.)


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